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ABSTRACT:  This paper provides copious results from a 2003 survey of academics.  We 
analyze the responses of 1208 academics from six scholarly associations (in 
anthropology, economics, history, legal and political philosophy, political science, and 
sociology) with regard to their views on 18 policy issues.  The issues include economic 
regulations, personal-choice restrictions, and military action abroad.  We find that the 
academics overwhelmingly vote Democratic and that the Democratic dominance has 
increased significantly since 1970.  A multivariate analysis shows strongly that 
Republican scholars are more likely to land outside of academia.  On the 18 policy 
questions, the Democratic-voter responses have much less variation than do the 
Republicans.  The left has a narrow tent.  The Democratic and Republican policy views 
of academics are somewhat in line with the ideal types, except that across the board both 
groups are simply more statist than the ideal types might suggest.  Regarding disciplinary 
consensus, we find that the discipline with least consensus is economics.  We do a cluster 
analysis, and the mathematical technique sorts the respondents into groups that nicely 
correspond to familiar ideological categories: establishment left, progressive, 
conservative, and libertarian.  The conservative group and the libertarian group are equal 
in size (35 individuals, each), suggesting that academics who depart from the leftist ranks 
are as likely to be libertarian as conservative.  We also find that conservatives are closer 
to the establishment left than they are to the libertarians. 
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Americans are asking themselves why they pay so much money to professors 
whose work is often purely “academic” and whose political ideas typically are left-wing.  
This paper presents results from a large survey of academics.  We look at the data from 
many different angles, using detailed figures, cross-tabulations, multivariate analysis, and 
cluster analysis.  The chief goal of this paper is to see what the data say about the 
ideological composition of academia.   
Not addressed in this paper is the big question: Why are academics so left-wing, 
and so uniformly so?   
We find that to best analyze the ideological character of cultural institutions we 
necessarily take sides.  The numbers are what they are, but we have developed the 
numbers in a research process and present them here in particular ways.  The reader will 
want to know where ideologically we are coming from.  Thus, we think it useful to say 
upfront that our sensibilities are classical liberal/libertarian.   
 
U.S. Professors under the Microscope 
 
In their 1975 work The Divided Academy, Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Seymour 
Martin Lipset wrote that the empirical record has sustained Richard Hofstadter’s 
generalization that from the late nineteenth century “the political weight of American 
intellectuals, including leading academics, has been disproportionately on the 
progressive, liberal, and leftist side” (p. 14).  Survey evidence as early as 1937 showed 
  1that social science professors were disproportionately Democratic (Ladd and Lipset 1975, 
27f; on Canadian professors using 1987 data see Nakhaie and Brym 1999). 
But the professors went contrary to what Charles B. Spaulding and Henry A. 
Turner (1968) called “a well established empirical finding,” namely that “persons 
occupying the favored positions in American society tend on the whole to be Republicans 
and to exhibit conservative political attitudes” (p. 247).  It was conjectured that social-
science professors exhibited critical thinking and an interest in social criticism, and hence 
were “liberal” and Democratic.  From 1959 to 1964, Spaulding and Turner conducted 
surveys of scholarly associations.  They found that philosophers, sociologists, political 
scientists, historians, and psychologists were on the whole about 3-to-1 Democrat to 
Republican, while botanists, geologists, mathematicians, and engineers were much more 
likely to be Republican (Spaulding and Turner 1968, 253).  The findings were “consistent 
with the idea that an important element in explaining the difference is the degree to which 
the perspectives of the members of each profession tend to be oriented toward social 
criticism or [like the botanists etc.] the application of knowledge in the business world” 
(p. 247).  The early sociology literature projected the idea that elites were tied into the 
status-quo and hence were conservative, while college professors and others posed a 
challenge to the system.  Sometimes the literature (e.g., Gouldner 1970) accused the 
professoriate, especially the academic elites, of being too tied into the system and too 
conservative.   
The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education in 1969 and 1975 and the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in 1984 conducted national 
surveys of U. S. professors (Carnegie Council 1978; Carnegie Foundation 1989).  A 
  2major figure in bringing the survey data and other evidence to bear on previous 
conjectures was Seymour Martin Lipset, who, with E.C. Ladd, strove to integrate 
interpretation and evidence (Lipset and Ladd 1972; Ladd and Lipset 1975).  Lipset and 
his collaborators challenged hypotheses floated by sociologists, and found that most 
academics are “liberal” or left, and the more eminent members especially so (Lipset and 
Ladd 1972; Lipset 1982).  Lipset’s take on the subject was somewhat blurry.  In his early 
years he comes across as an earnest leftist sociologist interested in getting a better 
empirical handle on the matter, but in later years he despairs over the state of sociology 
(Lipset 1994), and his work sustains complaints about academia being too leftwing.
1   
In economics, surveying the tribe emerged later, but when it did, it was much 
more attentive to specific policy questions and it had a different emphasis.  Kearl et al 
(1979) initiated the tradition.  Their study asked public-policy questions, and many of 
their questions were reproduced by subsequent studies seeking to track trends in opinion 
(see for instance Alston et al 1992, Fuller and Geide-Stevenson 2003, Blendon et al 1997; 
Caplan 2001, 2002; Fuchs 1996; Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba 1998; Whaples 1995; 
1996; Moorhouse, Morriss, and Whaples 1999; on graduate students see Colander 2005).  
There have also been surveys of economists in other countries, with many similar 
questions (Frey et al 1984; Block and Walker 1988; Ricketts and Shoesmith 1990; 1992; 
Anderson and Blandy 1992; Anderson et al 1993).  One of the main themes in the 
economics tradition has been to ascertain whether the discipline displays “consensus,” a 
hallmark of science.  The surveys have generally shown little concern for party support or 
ideological self-description.  
                                                 
1 For criticism of Ladd and Lipset, see Hamilton and Hargens (1993).  In our opinion, much of the 
controversy (and opacity) stems from problems with “liberal vs. conservative.”  
  3In fields other than sociology and economics, there seem to be little tradition of 
self-investigation.  But scholars are now being placed under the microscope, for example 
in political science by Heckelman and Whaples (2003) and psychology by Ray (1989) 
and Redding (2001). 
Stanley Rothman, Robert Lichter and Neil Nevitte (2005) continue in the 
Carnegie/Lipset tradition, and show that the ideological homogeneity in academia has 
intensified in the past few decades.  Other surveys that reinforce these conclusions 
include work by the Brookings Institution (2001) and the Higher Education Research 
Institute at University of California, Los Angeles (Lindholm et al 2003).  The results are 
further bolstered by voter registration investigations, such as Zinsmeister (2002), 
Horowitz and Lehrer (2002), Klein and Western (2005), and Cardiff and Klein (2006).  
The politics of academia is now a major topic in public discourse and increasingly among 
intellectuals themselves; for example, a recent issue of this journal contained the 
proceedings of a conference at Boston University on the state of the social sciences, with 
a session specifically on the political leanings of the social sciences (Critical Review 
2005: 187-208). 
Here we draw on a 2003 survey designed by Daniel Klein, but handled and 
certified by an independent controller.  We (Klein and Charlotta Stern) have published 
several papers that make narrower use of the survey data.
2 
                                                 
2 2005a focus on the Democrat-to-Republican ratio throughout the social sciences and humanities, 2004 
focus on the policy views of anthropologists and sociologists, 2005b and 2005c focus on the policy views 
of economists; 2005d focuses on the policy views of political scientists; 2006 draws on the survey results 
for sociologists in calling for a place for classical liberalism in sociology. 
 
  4  There is one way in which our investigation is quite unique.  Most surveys that 
ask about ideology employ the conventional “liberal v. conservative” formulation.  We 
feel that that formulation is confining and often either insubstantive or misleading.  In our 
survey, we used a format that lends itself to a “statist v. libertarian” formulation.  This 
formulation is more substantive and more flexible, in that the raw material it generates 
can be used to construct and identify familiar ideological categories, as the cluster 
analysis here shows. 
 
Description of Data 
 
The data comes from a survey taken in the Spring of 2003.  It was designed so as 
to achieve the following goals: (1) to elicit an overall judgment of support or opposition 
on 18 types of government activism; (2) to make the format uniform so that an 
individual’s set of responses could be combined into an index; and (3) to illuminate 
ideological divisions within disciplines, especially by voting behavior.
3   
We surveyed members of six nationwide scholarly associations: 
American Anthropological Association 
American Economics Association 
American Historical Association 
American Political Science Association 
American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy
4 
American Sociological Association   
 
                                                 
3 In all three respects, sections of both of the two specialized surveys (one of labor economists, one of 
public economists) in Fuchs et al. 1998 are very much like our survey in design and spirit (see pp. 1416, 
1420). 
4 The American Philosophical Association declined to sell us an address lists, based on a general policy of 
not giving out addresses except for matters of special interest to philosophers.  We surveyed all 486 
members of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy.  Their membership base is smaller 
and more specialized and we have chosen to exclude them in some of the analyses that follows.  
  5The associations supplied randomly generated lists, and in five of the six cases the survey 
was mailed to 1000 members, and to 486 members in the odd case, making a total of 
5,486 surveys mailed out.  Of those, 1678 (nonblank) surveys were returned, a response 
rate of 30.9 percent (correcting for P.O returns etc.).
5  As shown in Table 1, the 
individual association response rates varied from 22.6 to 35.2 percent. 
Table 1:  Response rate by association surveyed 
  Surveys returned non-blank  Response rate (%) 
Anthropology 349  34.9 
Economics 264  26.6 
History 297 30.9 
Philosophy (pol./legal)  108  22.6 
Political Science  309  31.0 
Sociology 351  36.2 
Total 1678  30.9 
 
 
If our survey results are misleading, it could be for two reasons: 
Response bias. It could be that, for example, Democrat members are more likely 
to complete and return the survey than Republican and other members.  No 
available evidence speaks to this possibility.
 6  We are inclined to doubt that any 
such bias is significant. 
Membership bias.  There could be a bias in the membership of the associations.  
For example, maybe Democratic anthropologists are more likely to be members 
of the American Anthropological Association than Republican anthropologists.  
When we embarked on this investigation in 2003 we figured such bias would be 
insignificant, as five of the six associations are the major nationwide association 
                                                 
5   At the survey home page one can view the survey instrument and documents explaining the methods, 
independent control, and certification of the survey results.  The survey homepage URL is 
http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/klein/survey.htm. 
6 For what it’s worth, the Fuller et al 1995 survey of delegates at the 1992 national conventions received 21 
response rate from Democrats and 26 percent from Republicans. 
  6of the discipline.  But the more we have learned about the associations the more 
we suspect that there is a Democrat/left tilt in the membership, although we doubt 
that it is very large (on the American Economic Association, see McEachern 
2006; Klein 2006).  We anticipate having a better handle on this question in the 
near future.   
At present, we suspect that there is some membership bias, but that it is only small to 
moderate.  One reason to doubt that the biases are large is that our findings here for the 
Democrat-to-Republican ratios generally agree with other D to R estimates, notably the 
voter registration studies (which depend neither on response nor association membership) 
and the survey reported by Rothman et al (2005).  Note that even if it were the case that 
the associations do have a moderate social-democratic tilt, it would not much affect the 
general importance of the results.  The major nationwide associations are the leading 
organizational and publishing institutions of the discipline, and members generally have 
more influence than non-members.  Put differently, the more clout that someone of an 
ideology has, the more likely it is that she is a member of the major association. 
 
Academics’ Voting Patterns 
 
The present article is concerned with respondents with academic careers.  One 
survey question asked:  
 
 
  7Pleased check your primary employment (if retired, kindly answer 
retrospectively): 
  □   □   □   □      ________ 
   academic             public                   private         independent         other 




7 academic were anthropology 73.1 percent, economics 
48.5 percent, history 71.4 percent, philosophy 76.6 percent, political science 86.4 percent, 
and sociology 74.9 percent.  In this paper we focus on those respondents who reported 
being or having been primarily employed in academia, 1208 individuals constituting 72 
percent of the sample.   
A question asked the respondent to check highest degree held, and the frequency 
of responses for those in academics is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Frequency of highest degree for academic sample 
Highest degree  Frequency % of this 
sample
Ph.D. 1151 95.28 
Masters 47 3.89 
Bachelor’s 4 0.33 
J.D. 3 0.25 
Other 3 0.25   
 
The voting question was as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
7 42 respondents marked either public sector, private sector, or independent research, but we included them 
as academic based on their comments and answers to the two immediately ensuing questions, which are 
predicated on academic employment. 
  8To which political party have the candidates you’ve voted for in the past ten years 
mostly belonged? 
  □   □   □   □      ________ 
   Democratic            Green                   Libertarian         Republican         other 
  
 
Among the 1208 academic respondents reported voting as follows: 962 (79.6 %) 
Democratic (D), 112 (9.3 %) Republican (R), 17 (1.4 %) Green, 13 (1.1 %) Libertarian, 
29 (2.4 %) checked two or more responses, 16 ( 1.3 %) wrote in another party, 17 (1.4 %) 
said they cannot or do not vote, and 42 (3.5 %) did not respond to the question. 
The D-to-R ratios of the six groups are shown in Figure 1.
8  We combine 
anthropology and sociology because in those groups the number of Republicans was very 
low and because the response patterns to the policy questions were very similar (see 
Klein and Stern 
                                                 
8 These ratios differ from those determined by Klein and Stern 2004c, which includes academic 
respondents only up to the age of 70. 
  92005b).
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Using these results and other evidence, Klein and Stern (2005c) arrive at the 
estimate that the D-to-R ratio for the active
9 social-science and humanities faculty 
nationwide is probably at least 8 to 1.
10  That estimate lines up with voter-registration 
                                                 
9 By “active” we mean those up through age 70 at the time of the survey. 
10 When we made those estimates we were less concerned about membership bias.  That concern has 
increased somewhat in our mind, and ratcheting the “at least” estimate down to 7 to 1 is not a bad idea.  
Still,we recommend the 8 to 1 estimate, as it was from the start a rather “conservative” estimate in its 10 to 
1 assumption about the entire not-economics social-science/humanities faculty. 
  10results and is further bolstered by Rothman et al (2005, 6).  Drawing on the survey data 
provided in Ladd and Lipset (1975), Table 3 shows that the ratio has changed since 1970.  
The 1964 election (Johnson v. Goldwater) had a distribution like that in 2003, but the 
composite for ’64/’68/’72 indicates that since that era the ratio has doubled.   
















Social  Science 8.9:1 3.8:1 3.5:1 
Humanities  6.6:1 3.1:1 2.4:1  4:1 8:1
  Source: Ladd and Lipset 1975, 62-64   
 
On the whole, compared to younger professors, older professors are somewhat 
more often Republican.  Figure 2 shows by generations the D and R proportions for each 
discipline (limited to the either-D-or-R sample).  We see that the D percentages are 
generally trending up and the R percentages are generally trending down.  In particular, 
there is no evidence that the youngest generation breaks the trend (only the economics 
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Figure 2: Democratic and Republican voting, by age groups, by discipline. 
 
Policy Views, Ds and Rs  
 
Figure 3 consists of 18 small panels.  Each panel shows the exact wording of the 
policy question, the response distribution for D voters and R voters, and the mean values.  
We suggest that our sample probably pretty well represents overall social-
science/humanities faculty, because, although the economists had a relatively low 
response rate (26.6 %) and a low academic rate (48.5 %), they are here part of a sample 
that does not include many, many of the social-science/humanities disciplines, and we are 
quite sure that those disciplines are rather like the non-economists in the sample.  That is, 
in the social sciences/humanities generally, there is only one economics, and it is in the 
  12sample, so even though economics is whittled down by the response rate and the 
academic variable, that probably would tend to compensate for the narrowness of the set 
of disciplines sampled. 
 
Figure 3: Policy-Issue Response Distributions of Academic 
Ds (solid) and Rs (striped) 
 
support    support    have mixed     oppose    oppose 
strongly     mildly       feelings      mildly  strongly 
1    2        3        4     5 
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Pharmaceutical market regulation by the Food and 
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  13Air-quality and water-quality regulation by the 
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Laws making it illegal for private parties to 
discriminate (on the basis of race, gender, age, 
ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation) against 
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Laws restricting the use and exchange of “hard” 













D: 2.36 R: 2.00
 














D: 3.15 R: 2.76
 













D: 2.76 R: 2.72
 













D: 1.30 R: 3.14
 














D: 3.20 R: 4.56
 
Redistribution policies (transfer and aid programs 
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D: 3.59 R: 2.20
 
  15American military aid or presence abroad to 
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Foreign aid and assistance by such organizations as 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 













D: 2.02 R: 2.44
 
 
The 18 panels of Figure 3 are a good opportunity to make some basic points about 
the data. 
A. Do the Ds and Rs Conform to Ideal Types? 
 
The ideal-typical Democrat is suspicious of private business and market forces 
(“capitalism”).  She tends to be permissive on “deviant” life-styles and choices (Ladd and 
Lipset 1975, 39; Redding 2001, 205).  She is likely to support government policies to 
protect the poor and the excluded, and to believe in government regulation as a means to 
correct social problems such as racism or school segregation.  The Democrat tends to be 
pacifist and more critical of American military interventions abroad.  The ideal-typical 
Republican is friendly to private business and market forces.  He tends to be restrictive on 
“depraved” life-styles and choices.  He is suspicious toward government, and believes in 
self-reliance rather than government protection.  He is a patriot and believes that the 
government should protect the American people from external threats.  Thus, the 
Republican is more favorable to military action and immigration restrictions.  
  16Do the results in the 18 panels generally support the ideal types?  In terms of the 
differences between Democrats and Republicans, the results line up with the ideal types.  
But both groups of academics are more quite statist even where they are supposed to be 
somewhat libertarian.  Though less enthusiastic than Democrats, Republicans are not 
opponents of economic regulation and redistribution.  And, though (only slightly) less 
paternalistic than Republicans, Democrats are not opponents of restrictions on hard 
drugs, prostitution, and gambling, nor are they preponderantly strong opponents of 
military action abroad. 
  
B. The Democratic Tent Is Narrow 
 
The social-sciences/humanities faculty is pretty much a one-party system.  But if 
the Democratic tent were a broad tent, then a one-party system may have intellectual 
diversity.  The 18 panels show, however, that the Democrats have almost no diversity of 
opinion on minimum wage, occupational safety, FDA regulation, the EPA, 
discrimination, gun control, redistribution, and schooling.  On an issue-by-issue basis, the 
Democrats show much less diversity than the Republicans.  Table 4 shows the sum of the 
18 policy-response standard deviations: 
 
Table 4: The Democratic tent is narrower 
 






  17The point can be shown another way.  For each respondent we can compute an 
overall score on the 18 policy issues: the strong statist would have a score of 1, and the 
strong libertarian would have a score close to 5.
11  Figure 4 shows the Republicans’ 
distribution by discipline by 0.5 intervals.  (The figure and ensuing presentations omit the 
data from the survey of the American Society for Political Legal Philosophy, because 
doing so reduces clutter and because the ASPLP sample is small, had a low response rate, 
and does not clearly correspond to a particular department on campus.  Including the data 
would not change the character of the results.)   
Figure 4: 
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Anthsoc History Political Science Economics  
                                                 
11 We say “close to” (rather than “equal to”) because some of the policy issues admit of disagreement over 
what the more or less statist (or libertarian) answer would be.  Notably, some would say that toppling an 
exceptionally oppressive government abroad, despite being activist on the part of the U.S. government, is 
not anti-libertarian, because it reduces government coercion on net.  Reasonable disagreement over what is 
more or less libertarian would also be found for the questions on monetary policy and perhaps immigration 
(because of how immigrants supposedly alter the political culture and hence future policy). 
  18 
We see in Figure 4 that the preponderance of Republicans are in the 1.5 to 3.0 
range, but that there are some scattered further to the right, particular among economists.  
Figure 5 shows the same for the Democrats.  They are much more tightly packed.  
Almost none had scores above 3.0, and, in fact, not one above 3.5.  Not only do the 
Democrats utterly dominate the social sciences and humanities, but they have a narrow 
tent of belief.  Clearly, campus diversity does not extend to political/policy ideas and 
values. 
Figure 5: 
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Anthsoc History Political Science Economics  
 
C. Statism v. Libertarianism 
The 18 panels show that the vast majority of academics are quite statist.  On 12 of 
the 18 policy issues, the average D response and the average R response are both 3.00 or 
  19lower.  The Ds overall indicate strong support on 8 of the 18 public policies: minimum 
wage laws, the OSHA, the FDA, the EPA, discrimination laws, gun ownership laws, 
redistribution, and government schools.  Their highest mean response is on the 
immigration question, at 3.59, which is not very high.  Overall, the Democrats are 
supporters of status-quo interventions.  The Republicans have high mean responses on 
tariffs and on government ownership of industrial enterprises, but they are significantly 
more statist than the Democrats on immigration and military presence.  Most of the 
Republican mean responses are centrist.  Table 5 shows the 18-issue policy scores for the 
four groups of voters. 
Table 5: Both the Democrats and the Republicans are quite statist 
N  18-issue policy score, 
overall 
Dem. voters  962  2.12 
Rep. voters  112  2.69 
Green voters  17  2.30 
Libert. voters  13  4.24 
 
  
Another way to show the scantiness of libertarian opinion in academia is to put all 
the academic respondents (not just the Ds and Rs, and again excluding the ASPLP group) 













  20Figure 6: Most academics are highly statist. 
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Figure 6 shows that, in all the fields except economics, most respondents lay in 
the interval 1.5 to 2.5, indicating that the majority of social scientists support government 
activism on the 18 issues.
12     
 
Republicans Scholars Are More Likely to Land Outside Academia 
 
Again, we asked whether the respondent’s primary employment has been 
academic or various non-academic options.  As shown in Tables 6, non-academic 
                                                 
12 Fuller et al (1995) provide survey data comparing American Economics Association members with 
Republican delegates and Democratic delegates at the 1992 national conventions.  The survey contains 
many policy questions, though not immigration or military action.  The Republican delegates appear to be 
significantly more libertarian than economists, while the Democratic delegates do not appear to be 
noticeably more libertarian or more statist than the economists. 
 
  21scholars are more likely to vote Republican than academic scholars.  The same 
information is used in Table 7 to compute association members’ chances of landing 
outside of academia.  We see that across the board, Republicans are more likely to land 
outside of academia.  The results agree with the finding by Rothman et al (2005) that 
conservative scholars have less prestigious positions, controlling for research 
accomplishment. 
Table 6: D-to-R ratios by whether one is employed in academia vs. outside academia 
  Anth-Soc Economics History  Philosophy Pol.  Sci.  ALL 
  Ac.  Not Ac.  Not Ac. Not Ac.  Not Ac. Not Ac. Not 
Dem  443 139  78  75  169 61  64  18  208 29  962  322 
Repub  21 16  27 34  20 18  7  4  37 6  112  78 
D : R   21 8.7
**  2.9 2.2  8.5 3.4
**  9.1 4.5  5.6 5  8.6  4.1** 
** A chi-square test yields 0.01 significance between Academic and Not, within the discipline (differences 
in other disciplines are not significant at 0.10). 
 
Table 7: Chance of Landing Outside of Academia 
  Anth-Soc Economics  History  Philosophy Political 
Science  ALL 
Dem  0.239 0.490 0.268 0.220 0.126  0.25 
Repub  0.432 0.557 0.474 0.364 0.140  0.41 
 
We investigated whether the data evinces a tendency for individuals with higher 
(more libertarian) policy scores to land outside of academia.  When we examined low 
scores (1.0-2.5) versus high scores (3.5-5.0), we found that the highs were 
disproportionately landing outside of academia in anth-soc (significant at 0.01) and 
history (significant at 0.05).  We also looked at mean scores in the various categories.  
Overall, we did not find strong evidence for the claim, partly because scholars working in 
non-academic government jobs tended to have somewhat lower scores.  As we further 
breakdown the within-discipline data into private sector, independent research, etc. we 
get few respondents in each cell making it hard to address whether higher-score 
  22individuals tend to get sorted out.  One may conjecture that the relative-likelihood of 
membership is higher for an anti-left scholar in academia than for such scholar outside 
academia, because such a scholar joins mainly for professional reasons, which could 
mean that our data fail to evince a sorting-out that nonetheless exists. 
 
Younger Professors Are Slightly Less Statist 
 
The six panels of Figure 7 show the scatter of points for all academic respondents 
(not just the Ds and Rs) with horizontal birth-year and vertical individual’s score on the 
18 issues.  Every trend line is rising slightly.  That is, younger professors tend to be 
slightly less statist than older professors.
13  Similar scatter-plots (not presented here) 
show that Democrats in all six associations are trending upward in policy index, and 
Republicans in four of the six.  That is, almost across the board, the younger academics 









                                                 
13  Regressions using birthyear to predict policy scores turn out to be statistically significant in history (0.01 
percent level), in sociology (0.03) and in anthropology (0.10). 











1900 1920 1940 1960 19801900 1920 1940 1960 19801900 1920 1940 1960 1980
1 2 3






















If we assume that there is no tendency for the individual professor’s policy views 
to move in either direction (statist or libertarian), then these data suggest that academia, 
despite being more Democratic, is slightly less statist than in, say, 1970.  The six policy 
issues with largest correlation coefficient between birthyear and policy position (looking 
at all academics as one big group) are fiscal policy (0.25), immigration (0.22), FDA 
(0.16), foreign aid (0.13), minimum wage (0.12), drugs (0.11).  A negative coefficient is 
found for only two issues, redistribution and government schooling, but the coefficient 
sizes are tiny (-0.04 and –0.01, respectively).   
Although the birthyear trend line is slightly upward, we cannot be sure that 
academia is becoming correspondingly more libertarian.  It is quite possible that the 
longitudinal tendency is not flat—that is, that the individual tends to migrate one way or 
  24the other over time.  One theory is that ideological migrants tend to go in the libertarian 
direction, because collectivistic instincts and sentiments get “mugged by reality” and 
illusions about government and the political process tend to disintegrate.  A 
countervailing theory is that after years of immersion in the academy, the professor tends 
to move in the statist direction.
14  All we know for sure is that, today, younger professors 
tend to be slightly less statist than older professors. 
 
Cross-tabulation of policy scores 
In the tables below, we tabulate policy scores by discipline and political party.  
The 18 policy issues are separated into five sub-groups: economic interventions, 
government protection of the disadvantaged, gun control, cross-national government 
















                                                 
14 The survey asked the respondent what she thought on each issue when she was 25 years old.  The 
retrospective question is one we will be addressing when we get around to analyzing the when-25 data from 
our survey.   
  25Table 8: Academic Democrats’ and Republicans’ Views on Economic Interventions.  
Means (St.D) 
 Anth-Soc  History  Pol.  Sci  Economics 
Issue addressed  D  R D R D R D R 


























































































































































Difference:  ∑(D – R)  -4.09 -5.11  -6.06  -7.87 
 
The within-discipline t-tests show that many of the differences between Ds and Rs 
are significant at the one-percent level (see note a).  The within-party, between-discipline 
tests use anth-soc as the reference group (see notes b and c).  For instance, Ds in political 
science are more supportive of FDA regulation than Ds in anth-soc.  In nearly every case, 
academic economists of both parties are less supportive of economic intervention than 
their counterparts in the other disciplines.  This does not translate into an economists’ 
                                                 
a  T-test (unequal st. d.) of within-discipline difference between mean D and mean R responses, significant 
at the 0.01 level. 
b  0.01 level significant difference by discipline in a within-Democrats regression, with dummy indicators 
for discipline, using anth-soc as the reference group. 
c  0.01 level significant difference by discipline in a within-Republicans regression, with dummy indicators 
for discipline, using anth-soc as the reference group. 
 
  26consensus, however.  Adding up the differences between the Ds and Rs (the last row of 
Table 8) suggest that the difference between the two parties is largest in economics.  
Comparing the standard deviations of the Ds (the larger of the two groups) indicate that 
on most economic policy issues, the Ds in economics show more variation than those in 
the other disciplines.   
Table 9 treats the role of government as a protector of the disadvantaged.   
Table 9Academic Democrats’ and Republicans’ Views on Government 
(Purportedly) Protecting the Disadvantaged.  Means (St.D) 
 Anth-Soc  History  Pol.  Sci  Economics 
Issue addressed  D R  D R D R D R 
Government production of 






































































































Difference:  ∑(D – R)  -3.79 -5.30 -4.58 -6.06 
a 
b 
c  Explained at the foot of Table 8. 
 
On three of the four issues, there are significant differences between the Ds and 
Rs in all the surveyed disciplines (indicated by footnote a).  When it comes to differences 
between the disciplines, the Ds in political science and economics are more supportive of 
foreign aid than those in anth-soc.  The Rs in history and economics are less supportive 
of discrimination controls than are the Rs in anth-soc.    
 
  27Table 10: Academic Democrats’ and Republicans’ Views on Gun Control 
Means (St.D) 
 Anth-Soc  History  Pol.  Sci  Economics 
Issue addressed  D  R D R D R D R 





















Difference:  ∑(D – R)  -1.90 -1.38  -1.57  -2.25 
a 
b 
c  Explained at the foot of Table 8. 
 
The Ds overall are supportive of gun control.  The Ds in history are more 
supportive than Ds in anth-soc.   
Table 11:Academic Democrats’ and Republicans’ Views on Cross-national 
Government Activism.Means (St.D) 
 Anth-Soc  History  Pol.  Sci  Economics 
Issue addressed  D R D R  D R D R 






















































































Difference:  ∑(D – R)  3.41 3.86 2.02 1.07 
a 
b 
c  Explained at the foot of Table 8. 
 
 
In Table 11, we see that the Rs are more supportive of immigration controls and 
military action abroad.  Note that the survey was conducted during the onset of the 
United States government’s invasion of Iraq, and it is possible that political loyalties and 
animosities were intensified with respect to the military question.  
  28While the Rs in economics are the most strongly opposed to protective tariffs, 
those in History are the group most favorable to protection.  It seems that there are a few 
nativistic Republican historians out there (note also their immigration score). 
Table 12:Academic Democrats’ and Republicans’ Views on Personal Choice 
Controls.Means (St.D) 
 Anth-Soc  History  Pol.  Sci  Economics 
Issue addressed  D  R D R D R D R 









































































Difference:  ∑(D – R)  1.41 1.90  1.03  -0.79 
a 
b 
c  Explained at the foot of Table 8. 
 
When it comes to the public policies regulating personal choices, the Ds seem to 
be more permissive overall, but the differences are often not significant at the 0.01 level.  
Historian and political science Ds are less supportive of drug prohibition than the Rs.  
Among the anth-socs, the Ds are less favorable to prostitution controls than are the Rs, 
and historian Ds are less likely to support restrictions on gambling than are the Rs. 
Across the disciplines, the Ds in history and political science are more supportive of drug 
prohibition than the Ds in anth-soc.  Many items in the tables tell us that economics 
Republicans are more libertarian than the other Republicans.  In fact, on sex, drugs, and 
gaming, econ Rs are more libertarian than econ Ds, contradicting one of the ideal typical 
differences between Rs and Ds..   
  29Remarks about Economics.  Table 13 provides the means and standard 
deviations on all 18 policy issues.  Economics stands out in several ways.   
Table 13:Academics’ Mean 18-issue Score by D v. R and by Discipline
a 
 Anth-Soc  History  Political  Science  Economics 









































a For the academic philosophy respondents (ASPLP), the means, st.d.s and Ns are as follows: D: 2.15 (0.46) 
64; R: 2.94 (1.15) 7; All: 2.33 (0.71) 82. 
 
1.  Economics’ mean score of 2.65 is significantly higher than the others.  However, 
it is generally statist.  Rumors of economists generally being free-market 
supporters are unfounded.  By the metrics of the survey, economists on the whole 
are much closer to the rest of social-science professors than to moderate 
libertarians (the 13 Libertarian-voting academics in the sample had a mean score 
of 4.24). Economists’ average score exceeds 4.0 on only two issues: tariffs and 
government ownership of industry. 
2.  Economics is sometimes said to be the most scientific of the social sciences.  
Many have alleged that one of the hallmarks of science is consensus.  One would 
think that the most scientific discipline would exhibit the most consensus.  We 
find, however, the economics demonstrates the least consensus.  In economics, 
the 18-issue-score standard deviations are largest within each party and overall.
15  
                                                 
15 The tables here do not show the individual-issue st.d.s for the entire group.  The sum of the 18 st.d.s is 
highest for economics at 22.90, and lowest for anth-soc at 17.84. 
  30Indeed, of the five scholarly groups,
16 economists exhibit the least consensus on 
13 of the 18 issues: minimum wage, OSHA, FDA, EPA, discrimination, drugs, 
prostitution, gambling, guns, redistribution, government schooling, monetary 
policy, and fiscal policy.  It is frequently on their own scientific turf that 
economists’ collective judgment least satisfies the supposed hallmark of science.  
Our own (libertarian) interpretation of the finding is one that is favorable to 
economics, relative to the other disciplines: Better to have a lack of consensus 
than a misguided consensus.   
3.  However, on four issues where Democrats have a relatively high score, especially 
tariffs and government ownership of industry, but also immigration and military, 
the economists have the most consensus. A crude way of reading the consensus 
(st.d.) results is that economic thinking goes with higher policy scores, and when 
general academic (i.e., Democratic) opinion is very statist, that spells less 
consensus, but when general academic opinion is moderate, that spells more 
consensus.  (The only issue on which economists have neither the highest nor the 
lowest st.d. is foreign aid.) 
Statistical Investigation of Voting 
 
Here we report multivariate regressions to determine statistical correlations with 
voting D (and D-and/or-Green).  The analysis includes the data from the philosophy 
group (the ASPLP).  The analysis drops respondents with missing data for one or more of 
                                                 
16 That is, continuing to treat anth-soc as one group, and including also the philosophers as a separate 
group. 
  31the variables (however, the policy-index variable is computed and intact so long as the 
respondent answered at least one of the 18 policy questions).  The first two statistical 
models make the dependent variable voting D as opposed to voting R; that is, Models 1 
and 2 are confined to respondents who vote either D or R.  Model 3 makes the dependent 
variable voting D-and/or-Green
17 (“left”), as opposed to voting R-and/or-Libertarian 
(“right”), and hence is confined to that slightly enlarged set of respondents.  The Ns for 
each model are reported in Table 14. 
We use several independent variables.  To check whether voting D corresponds 
with generally being statist on the issues, we include the 18-issue policy index as an 
independent variable. 
Another independent variable is political socialization.  Political socialization has 
been studied mostly in terms of parents-to-child transfer of political party identification 
(see for instance Tedin 1974, , Glass et al 1986, Niemi and Jennings 1991,Beck and 
Jennings 1975, 1991, Sears and Funk 1999, Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 1999,).  Our 
survey asked: “How would you describe the overall political-party affiliation of the 
family you grew up in” and offered the options “mostly Democratic,” “mostly 
Republican,” “A mixture,” and “non-political.”  In the statistical model, we include two 
indicators of parental influence.  One indicates that the respondent reported parents being 
mostly Democratic, and the other mostly Republican.  The reference category is 
respondents who record their parents being either a mixture of the two or non-political. 
                                                 
17 We say D-and/or-Green, rather than D-or-Green, because 16 respondents checked both D and Green (and 
similarly, 3 checked R and Libertarian).  Such double-checking respondents (some of which are non-
academics) are included in Model 3. 
  32We test to see whether non-academic scholars are less likely to vote Democratic 
than academic scholars.  A positive correlation between voting D and being an academic 
would suggest sorting effects.   
Respondents in anthropology and sociology had the highest D-to-R ratios, while 
respondents in economics had the lowest D-to-R ratio and the lowest academic 
frequency.  To control for such extremities by discipline, we include as independent 
variables both anth-soc and economics. 
In Model 1 we include a generational variable based on the year of the 
respondent’s highest degree.  According to legend, the universities and colleges were 
radicalized during the late 1960s and 1970s, and attracted individuals inclined to vote D, 
making a cohort or generational effect (Sears 1983).  This effect would suggest that those 
who got their degree in the “radical era” would be more likely to be Ds than those before 
and after.  We include two indicators, one that the respondent received her highest degree 
before 1968 (pre-68) and the other that she received it after 1980 (post-80).  The 
reference category is respondents who received their degree between 1968 and 1980. 
In Model 2 we omit the generational variable, and insert a different variable based 
on degree year.  One theory holds that as a particular worldview comes to dominate a 
discipline, it reproduces itself.  Hence the likelihood of voting D would increase over 
time. We test to see whether those with more recent degrees are more likely to vote D.  
The time trend variable is 2003 (the year of the survey) minus the year the respondent 
earned her highest degree. 
In Model 3, we replicate the composition of Model 2, but do the regression on D-
and/or-Green versus R-and/or-Libertarian. 
  33Table 14.  Odds ratios of voting D (with z-values in parentheses) 
 Model  1 
D v. R 
Model 2 
D v. R 
Model 3 
D/G v. R/L  



















































Degree pre-1968  0.72 
(1.46) 
  
Degree post-1980  1.25 
(0.95) 
  






N  1365 1365 1414 







2  0.24 0.25 0.28 
**  0.01 level, 
*  0.05 level, † 0.10 level 
 
In the first model of Table 14, the results support the socialization hypothesis – 
individuals with Democratic parents are more likely, and those with Republican parents 
are less likely, to vote D compared to the neutral parent group.  Also, again we see that 
scholars in academia are more likely to vote D than scholars outside academia.  
Earlier we saw that, by far, anthropology and sociology had the highest D-to-R 
ratios and economics the lowest.  With the other variables present, the economics effect 
does not hold up as significant, suggesting that one’s policy score, not economic training 
  34per se, correlates inversely with voting D.
18  However, anth-soc continues to be 
significant, suggesting that there is something especially left-wing about the 
anthropology and sociology professions.  
Model 1 does not find a “radical era” effect.  Respondents with pre-1968 degrees 
and post-1980 degrees do not differ significantly from the “radical era” respondents.  
Model 2, however, introduces the trend effect (year of degree), and it is significant.  The 
longer ago the respondent got her degree, the less likely she is to vote D.  One 
interpretation is self-reinforcing Democratic domination. 
Model 3 separates by “left” and “right,” and the results are unchanged.  
In summary, voting D is significantly correlated with each of the following: 
having Democratic parents, being employed in academia, being an anthropologist or 
sociologist, having statist policy views, and having a more recent degree. 
 
Exploring Ideological Groupings Using Cluster Analysis 
 
Cluster analysis is a mathematical technique to identify groupings of observations 
(Everitt 1993, 10).  There are many ways to perform cluster analysis and what we present 
here is the result of one particular cluster analysis that we found to be intuitive and 
interesting.  However, the results presented here were typical of the many variations we 
investigated.
19    
                                                 
18 We also ran Model 1 without the policy index.  In that case, being an economist has a negative effect on 
voting D and is significant at the 0.01 level. 
19 We have created a large unpublished pdf-file appendix where we show results from alternative methods 
of performing the analysis. The appendix shows that all the methods generally results either very much like 
  35Using STATA 8, we performed a clustering technique in which the N 
observations start out as N separate groups each of size one.  The two closest groups are 
merged into one group and so on until all observations are merged into one large group.  
To define the closest two groups to be merged, we use complete linkage clustering, a 
technique that determines the farthest observations between two groups and merge 
groups accordingly.
20  The technique drops any observations with missing values.  To 
reduce the loss of data, we excluded three policy issues: monetary and fiscal policy 
because many respondents indicated “have no opinion,” and the “government production 
of schooling” question, because a substantial number of respondents did not answer the 
question.
21 
                                                                                                                                                 
or compatible with the results of the single analysis presented here.  The appendix is available online at 
http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/klein/survey/Alternative_cluster_analyses_appendix.doc. 
20 The cluster analysis uses the default L2 Euclidean distance.  
21  In the online appendix we have an alternative strategy were we treat “have no opinion” as “have mixed 
feelings” answers (hence coding them as 3 rather than missing) and keep fiscal and monetary policy items 
in the analyses.  The results are similar.   
  36Figure 8: Dendrogram of the complete linkage cluster analysis 
 
 
The dendrogram (or cluster tree) shows how observations are grouped.  Not 
shown in the dendrogram is the actual bottom of the tree, where each observation is its 
own group.  The dendrogram picks up where the data have been grouped into 40 groups 
(labeled G1 through G40).  The N labels show the size of each of the 40 groups (G1 
contains 98 respondents).  Above the “tops” of the 40 groups, the dissimilarity measure is 
represented on the vertical axis.  Longer vertical lines indicate that the data contain more 
distinct clustering between groups, shorter lines indicate that groups are not as distinct.  
These dissimilarity measures form the basis of “stopping rules” to decide how many 
groups to identify. 
  37At the very top of Figure 8, all the respondents are include in one universal group.  
Moving down to the first break, it is a small libertarian group that is strikingly different 
from the great mass.  Continuing down, the great mass gets broken into two large groups.  
Continuing further, each large group gets divided.  Identifying five groups is supported 
by recognized procedures.
22  The result of this purely mathematically technique is five 
groups that correspond quite well to familiar ideological categories.   
We chose the descriptive names of the five groups after looking at the policy 
views.  Four correspond to intuitive ideological categories: progressive, establishment 
left, conservative, and libertarian.  One small group, which we call econ-polsci left, is 
leftist with views more like those of economists and political scientists. 
 
                                                 
22 In Table 6, we show the result of two “stopping rule” criteria, Calinski and Harabasz pseudo-F index and 
the Duda and Hart Je(2)/Je(1) index.  For both rules, larger index values indicate more distinct clustering.  
According to the Calinski and Harabasz stopping rule, our data contain two to five distinct groups (see 
Table 15).   
Table 15: Determining the Number of Clusters in the Data 





Je(2)/Je(1) Pseudo  T
2 
1 0.8771  139.86 
2  139.86  0.8905 118.36 
3  137.44 0.9261  36.54 
4  106.78  0.9031 53.97 
5  97.28 0.9225  34.52 
6 86.78  0.8744 51.12 
7 82.31  0.9454 27.03 
     8  76.21 0.8694  7.96 
 
In deciding the number of groups based on the Duda and Hart stopping-rule, the rule of thumb is to find 
Je(2)/Je(1) values that correspond to low pseudo T
2 values that has much larger pseudo T
2 values next to it 
(Stata Cluster Analysis Reference Manual. 2003, 97).  Thus, according to the Duda-Hart rule, it is 
reasonable to identify five distinct groups. 













Number in group  470 413 47  35  35  1000 
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a Figure 5 showed no academic Democratic voter with a policy index above 3.5, so it may seem odd to find 
that four of the libertarians vote Democratic.  One has a policy index of 4.22 but is in the ASPLP group, 
which is not included in Figure 5; the others have indices of 3.5, 3.5, and 3.39.  They end up in the 
libertarian group because of the pattern of their responses over the 18 questions.   
 
The establishment left and progressive groups are principally Democratic (81.7 
percent and 92 percent, respectively).  The econ-polsci left group is also mainly D voters, 
although it also has got its share of R voters.  The conservative group is mainly composed 
of R voters.  The libertarian group contains a smattering of voters, mainly R and L.  
 
 












N 470  413  47  35  35 
% Econ or Pol Sci  33.4  27.1  46.8  68.6  68.6 
% Anth or Soc  38.5 50.8 31.9 17.1  8.6 
Tariffs to protect 
industries and jobs 
3.45 3.66 3.57 4.14 4.91 
Minimum wage laws  1.29  1.25  2.32  3.69  4.66 
Occupational safety 
regs             (OSHA) 
1.21 1.15 1.40 2.40 4.09 
Pharmaceutical safety 
control         (FDA) 
1.18 1.34 1.51 2.46 4.26 
Air and water 
regulation     (EPA) 
1.13 1.09 1.30 2.34 3.80 
 
On economic regulations, the two huge groups, establishment left and 
progressives, are not much different.  The conservatives are more skeptical about 
economic regulations, but compared to the libertarians are rather statist. 













Discrimination controls  1.31 1.15 1.49 2.54 3.54 
Controls on “hard” drugs  1.59 2.97 3.91 1.46 4.06 
Prostitution controls  2.38 3.77 4.34 2.11 4.46 
Gambling restrictions  2.13 3.21 4.06 2.40 4.54 
Gun control  1.40 1.29 2.89 2.86 4.51 
 
In Table 18, the differences between the establishment left and the progressives 
are larger.  Progressives are much more opposed to government control on drugs, 
  40prostitution, and gambling, and they are slightly more supportive of control on guns and 
discrimination.  The conservatives are highly statist on drugs, prostitution, and gambling.    














Monetary policy  1.95 2.09 1.98 2.29 3.32 
Fiscal policy  1.95 1.98 2.22 2.88 4.30 
Redistribution  1.55 1.16 2.02 3.77 4.14 
Government schooling  1.70 1.36 1.76 2.67 4.11 
Government ownership of 
  industrial enterprises 
3.51 2.88 3.72 4.69 4.94 
Tighter controls on 
  Immigration 
3.14 4.05 2.17 2.31 3.54 
Military aid/presence abroad  3.08 3.92 2.55 2.03 3.09 
Foreign aid (World Bank, 
  IMF, USAID) 
1.95 2.21 2.30 2.49 3.91 
Policy index on all 18 issues  1.99 2.26 2.53 2.75 4.12 
 
Table 19 shows that the progressives are the most supportive of redistribution and 
government schooling, and even lean toward government ownership of industrial 
enterprises.  They are also the most opposed to tightening immigration controls and to 
military action abroad.   On those four issues, the progressives and conservatives are at 
opposite ends.  The conservatives tend to be supportive of tighter immigration controls 
and military action.  The libertarians are mixed on military action. 
As an overall indication, the bottom row presents the policy index scores for each 
group.  The establishment left are the most statist, followed by the progressives, the econ-
  41polsci left, the conservatives, and the libertarians.  It is clear that the libertarian group is 
the outlier, a fact that was highlighted at the top of the dendrogram by the libertarian 
group’s being the last group to join the whole.  
We constructed a simple measure of dyadic cluster dissimilarity.  For the 
progressives and establishment left, for example, we look at the absolute value of the 
difference between their mean score on tariffs, and likewise for each of the other 17 
issues, and add up the 18 differences.  Table 20 reports these dissimilarity measures.  It 
shows that the progressives and establishment left are very alike, with a dissimilarity of 
only 8.17.  The dissimilarity between the conservatives and the progressives is 24.22.  
The dissimilarity between the conservatives and the establishment left is 18.19.  But most 
notable is how dissimilar the libertarians are from any of the others.  The minimum of 
dissimilarities between them and any other group is greater than the maximum of the 
dissimilarities between any pair of other groups.  That is, libertarians and conservatives 
are less alike than progressives and conservatives!  











8.17  12.61 18.19 38.28 
Progres-
sive 
  11.88 24.22 36.33 
Econ-PolSci 
Left 
   17.80  28.67 
Conser-
vative 




  42Summary 
 
This article has presented a plethora of results from a large survey of six scholarly 
associations.  The main results may be summarized as follows: 
 
•  Democrats dominate the social sciences.  Anthropology and sociology are 
the most lopsided, with D-to-R ratios upwards of 20 to 1, and economics 
is the least lopsided, about 3 to 1.  Among professors up through age 70, 
the overall Democrat-to-Republican ratio is probably about 8 to 1. 
•  The Democratic domination has increased significantly since 1970.  
Republicans are being eliminated.   
•  On most of the 18 policy issues, the Democrats are more statist than the 
Republicans.  But on the whole Republicans were more statist on 
immigration, military action, drug prohibition, prostitution restrictions. 
•  Generally, the Democrats and Republicans fit the ideal-types.  Perhaps the 
greatest departure from the ideal types is that neither group is very 
libertarian on the issues they are supposedly more libertarian on.   
•  The Democrats not only dominate, but they have a narrow tent.  Whereas 
the Republicans usually have diversity on an issue, the Democrats very 
often have a party line.  It is clear that there is significantly more diversity 
under the Republican tent. 
•  On the whole, the Democrats and Republicans are quite statist. 
•  Economists are measurably less statist, but most of them are still quite 
statist. 
  43•  Economists show the least consensus on policy issues.  The differences 
between Democrats and Republicans are largest in economics, and the 
standard deviations are largest.  A lack of consensus is a curious thing for 
the “queen of the social sciences.” 
•  Younger professors tend to be slightly less statist than older professors. 
•  We find strong evidence that Republican scholars are more likely to be 
sorted out of academia. 
•  Voting D is significantly correlated with having Democratic parents, being 
employed in academia, being an anthropologist or sociologist, having 
statist policy views, and having a more recent degree. 
•  The cluster analysis sorted the respondents into five groups, four of which 
correspond to familiar and distinct ideological categories: establishment 
left, progressive, conservative, and libertarian. 
•  On three issues (drugs, prostitution, and military), the conservatives are 
the most statist of the five groups.  On five issues—drugs, prostitution, 
gambling, immigration, military action—the distance between the average 
conservative score and the average libertarian score was greater than that 
between progressive and libertarian.   
•  Simple measures show that the libertarians are quite exceptional.  The 
minimum of the dissimilarities between them and any other group is 
greater than the maximum of dissimilarity between any pair of other 
groups. 
 
  44The “liberal versus conservative” formulation of American politics omits the 
libertarians from the landscape, yet the libertarian and conservative groups appear to be 
equal in size in the social disciplines (each cluster-group consisted of 35 individuals).  If 
freedom is a core political value, then there is something very wrong with a formulation 
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